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1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that the job of a central banker is a hard one be-
cause of the uncertainty under which policy decisions have to be made.
There is uncertainty about the current state of the economy due to
delays with which statistics are released and to the preliminary nature
of the first releases, uncertainty about the nature of exogenous shocks,
and uncertainty about the model (i.e., about the mechanisms that gov-
ern the interactions among policy, private-sector expectations, and eco-
nomic performance).
Facing the complex problem of conducting policy under uncer-
tainty, however, the central banker seems to respond systematically to
(possibly filtered) output and inflation (Taylor, 1993, 1999; Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler, 2000). Although the exact form of this rule has been
the subject of debate, and although real-time estimates differ from the
simple ex-post Taylor fit (e.g., Orphanides et al., 2000; Orphanides,
2001, 2003; Rudebusch, 2002), Taylor rules, defined in the broad sense,
have been found to be a good characterization of monetary policy in
the medium run.
This paper asks whether this finding reflects the conduct of mone-
tary policy or the structure of the U.S. economy. We argue that the sim-
plicity of the empirical monetary policy rule is a consequence of the
simplicity of the U.S. economy and that a simple rule would have
emerged, in ex-post analysis, even if policy had responded to variables
other than output and inflation. From a real-time perspective, on the
other hand, a rule in terms of forecastable contemporaneous and fu-
ture output and inflation is observationally equivalent to a rule that
responds to large movements in all real and nominal variables.162 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
Simplicity, we find, takes three forms. First, only two shocks
drive the U.S. macroeconomy. These shocks explain the fundamental
business-cycle behavior of all key variables and, in particular, of the
federal funds rate, inflation, and output.
Second, the two orthogonal shocks can be robustly identified as
generating, respectively, medium- and long-run output dynamics and
medium- and long-run inflation dynamics. Medium- and long-term in-
flation and output, therefore, capture well the two-dimensional space
generated by the two shocks.
Third, once we extract from our series the medium- and long-run
signal, we find that the leading-lagging structure linking gross domes-
tic product (GDP) to other real variables is very simple and there is a
lot of synchronization within the real bloc. The same is true for infla-
tion and the nominal bloc.
Because two shocks explain the fundamental movements of the mac-
roeconomy, and as long as the Fed responds systematically to these
fundamental movements, the estimated rule would result in some ver-
sion of the Taylor rule, i.e., as a function linking the federal funds rate
to some transformation of output and inflation. Since the two large
shocks are nominal and real and they generate a simple dynamics in
the responses of, respectively, nominal and real variables, the transfor-
mation (the filters on output and inflation) has to be simple.
Simplicity is a consequence of the nature of the U.S. economy and
does not necessarily reflect simple policy. Our claims about simplicity
are based on the analysis of two panels of time series starting in 1970:
the panel of the Greenbooks forecasts, i.e., the forecasts prepared by
the Fed's staff to inform the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meetings (available up to 1996), and a panel of 200 time series that
roughly corresponds to what is used by the Fed in its short-term fore-
casting exercise (up to 2003).
We bring several pieces of evidence.
For both panels, two principal components explain more than 60%
of the total variance and over 70% of the variance of key variables,
such as the federal funds rate, output, industrial production, inflation
measures (these percentages are even higher at medium- and long-run
frequencies). This is not a surprising result, given strong comovements
between economic variables (see, for example, Sargent and Sims, 1977;
Stock and Watson, 2002; Giannone, Reichlin, and Sala, 2002; and Uhlig,
2003). It suggests that the stochastic dimension of the U.S. economy is
two.Monetary Policy in Real Time 163
This finding is confirmed by a real-time forecasting exercise. The
projection on two factors extracted from our large panel produces
forecasts of the GDP growth rate and inflation comparable with the
Greenbook forecasts and a forecast of the federal funds rate up to two
quarters ahead, which is in line with that of the future market. Our
analysis extends the forecasting exercise conducted in Bernanke and
Boivin (2003) and Stock and Watson (1999) and brings new interpreta-
tion. Our forecast exercise mimics the real-time analysis conducted by
the Fed in the sense that we use (as much as possible) sequential infor-
mation sets that were available historically. (On the concept of real-
time analysis, see Diebold and Rudebusch, 1991; Croushore and Stark,
1999; and Orphanides, 2001.) Since it is widely recognized that the
Greenbook forecasts and future market forecasts are hard to beat, this
is a remarkable result.
The good forecasting performance of the two-shocks model suggests
that the role for judgmental action is small and that the Fed, on aver-
age, disregards movements that are idiosyncratic and not too corre-
lated with the fundamental changes in the economy. Of course, the
Fed may have reasons to respond, at particular times, to idiosyncratic
events. However, if the Fed responded often to particular episodes gen-
erating idiosyncratic dynamics on exchange rate or financial markets,
for example, our forecast based on two factors would be much poorer.
Finally, the ex-ante and ex-post structural analysis of shocks and
propagation mechanisms, based on a novel identification procedure
that exploits the cross-sectional information in our large panel, un-
ravels common characteristics of the nominal and real side of the econ-
omy and indicates that the bulk of the dynamics of real variables is
explained by the same shock, while nominal variables, at medium-
long-run frequencies, are mainly explained by a shock orthogonal to
it. The ex-ante analysis focuses on particular historical events of large
inflation and output movements (recessions), which are the episodes
in which the Fed moves aggressively and are therefore the more
informative.
Our results suggest that a rule in terms of two variables is not iden-
tified uniquely. This might be bad news for econometricians, but it
is good news for real-time monetary policy because, by tracking any
forecastable measure of real activity and price dynamics, it does not
leave out any other dimension of the fundamentals.
Finally, an implication of our result of near-orthogonality of output
and inflation is that, while the dimension of the economy is two, the164 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
dimension of the policy problem is one. Although we cannot rule out
that this dichotomy may itself be the result of monetary policy, it is
quite striking that real-nominal orthogonality is also a feature of the
Fed's model that produces the Greenbooks forecasts. If this were really
an exogenous feature of the economy, we would conclude not only
that the U.S. economy is simple, but also that the job of the central
banker is easier than one may think!
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the ques-
tion on the number of shocks in the U.S. economy analyzing both
the panel of the Greenbook forecasts and a large panel of monthly
time series on about 200 monthly variables since 1970. Section 3 studies
the response of the federal funds rate to the exogenous shocks while
Section 5 draw implications on the form of the policy function. Section
6 concludes.
2. The Dimension of the Greenbook Model and of the U.S.
Economy
Macroeconomic variables comove, especially at business-cycle fre-
quencies and in the long run. This implies that the multivariate
dynamics of a large set of macroeconomic variables is driven by few
large shocks. This feature might be obscured by short-run dynamics,
typically reflecting measurement errors, poorly correlated across vari-
ables, and by the fact that the dynamics are not perfectly synchronized
across time series, but they can be recovered by simple statistical
methods. The degree of comovement can be measured by the percent-
age of the variance captured by the first few dynamic principal com-
ponents or by checking the goodness of fit of the projection of the
variables of interest onto principal components. Since macroeconomic
series are autocorrelated, what we are interested in is the approximate
dynamic rank, i.e., the approximate rank of the spectral density of the
panel. Principal components computed from the latter are linear com-
binations of present, past, and future observations rather than contem-
poraneous standard principal components (see Brillinger, 1981; Forni
et al., 2000).
Here we are dealing with two panels. First, a panel of about 200 se-
ries of monthly variables (only GDP and GDP deflator are quarterly),
whose structure is illustrated by Table 1. (The appendixes provide a
more detailed description of the data and of data transformations.)Monetary Policy in Real Time 165
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Surveys, industrial production series, labor market variables, and a
number of other series labeled as miscellaneous are typically the vari-
ables used by the Fed to nowcast and forecast GDP. We have added
prices and monetary and financial data (including exchange rates) to
cover the nominal side of the economy.
Our second panel is that of fifteen selected variables from the Green-
book forecasts.
1 This is a subsample of the forecasts prepared by
the board of governors at the Federal Reserve for the meetings of the
FOMC. They are published in correspondence with the dates of the
meetings (roughly every six weeks) and refer to quarterly data. Be-
cause Greenbook's forecasts are made publicly available with a five-
year delay, our data set ends in 1996. We consider meetings closer to
the middle of each quarter (four releases out of eight) and have
selected the fifteen variables for which forecasts are available since
1978 and are reported up to four quarters ahead. This panel mainly
contains forecasts of real variables, with less than a third representing
nominal variables. To understand the structure of our data sets, let us
define zt\v as the vector of the Greenbook forecasts computed at time v
for observations at time t — v — 2, v — 1, v, v + 1,..., v + 4. If t > v, we
have the forecasts; for t = v, we have the nowcasts; for t <v, the back-
casts. For example, at t = v — 1, we have the first release of GDP and
the final estimate of employment.
The same indexes can be used for the vintages of the panel of the 200
time series; let us define it as xt\v.
Let us first consider the panel xt\v, with v = 2003Q4. This is the last
available vintage on the 200 time series.
To study the degree of collinearity in the panel, we compute, for
each element xit\v, i = l,... ,n, and for each q = l,2,...,n, the q166 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
Table 2
Percentage of variance explained by the first five dynamic principal components on




















































































dimensional linear combination of present, past, and future observa-
tions kq(L)xt\v such that the following mean squared error is minimized:
MSEf(^) = E{Xit\v - Pro][xH\v\kq(L)xt\v]}
2
This quantity will give us, for each variable, the variance explained
by the q dynamic principal components (DPC). The average of these
quantities over z, l/n^-MSE,(^), gives us the variance explained for
the whole panel (see Brillinger, 1981).
We are interested in how close the dynamic covariance of the panel
(spectral density) is to rank two. If it were reasonably close, this would
imply that the projection of the variables onto the first two dynamic
principal components will give a good fit and that two macroeconomic
shocks generate most of the dynamics of the variables.
Table 2 reports the results for some selected variables (for t = v) and
the results for the sum of the mean squared errors over all variables
and for principal components
2 (with £7 = 1,2,..., 5). Two principal
components explain more than 60% of the variance of each selected
variable and of the whole panel. Key macroeconomic variables such as
GDP, industrial production, employment, price indexes, and the fed-
eral funds rate show percentages way above the average, implying
that they strongly comove with the rest of the economy.Monetary Policy in Real Time 167
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If variables comove, the same must be true, in general, for the fore-
casts, even if model misspecification could induce decorrelation in
some cases. Tables 3 and 4 report results describing the degree of
comovements in the panel of the Greenbook forecasts for different
horizons.
The principal component analysis of the Greenbook forecasts shows
that the percentage of the variance explained by two principal compo-
nents is larger than for the panel of the observations. This is not sur-
prising because forecasting implies smoothing idiosyncratic dynamics
that are typically highly volatile and unforecastable.
These results tell us that, to understand macroeconomic dynamics,
we need to study the effect of few shocks only. Few shocks also explain
the dynamics of the Greenbook forecasts.
More formal statistical analysis, along the lines of Forni et al. (2000)
could be used to select the number of pervasive shocks for these
panels. In this paper, however, since our goal is to understand the em-
pirical success of the Taylor rule, which is expressed in term of two
variables, we will follow a different route: fix the dimension of the
economy at q = 2 and, having made this choice, study the forecasting
performance and structural impulse responses with a two-shocks
model.
3
In their seminal paper, Sargent and Sims (1977) used a panel of
eleven monthly time series from 1950 to 1970 for the U.S. economy.
They obtained a result similar to what we found in this paper and in
Giannone, Reichlin, and Sala (2002) for a large panel of U.S. quarterly
data from 1982 to 2001. The two-shocks finding appears to be a robust
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2.1 Forecasting Output, Inflation, and the Federal Funds Rate with
Two Factors Extracted from Many Time Series
The descriptive analysis above suggests that output variables, aggre-
gate price indexes, and the federal funds rate exhibit a higher than av-
erage degree of commonality: more than 70% of the variance of these
variables can be explained by a projection on two aggregates.
4 This in
turn suggests that a models with two shocks should be empirically
successful in explaining the federal funds rate.
In this section, we will produce forecasts of the federal funds rate
using two orthogonal aggregate shocks extracted from our panel. We
take the results of this forecast as a benchmark, i.e., the best we can ob-
tain from a projection on a two-dimensional span. We expect to obtain
results reasonably close to those of the private-market forecasts (the
futures).
The same strategy will be used to forecast output and inflation.
Given our results on the dimension of the Greenbook forecasts, we ex-
pect to obtain results similar to those reported in the Greenbook.
The forecasting exercise is a pseudo real-time experiment in which
we try to mimic as closely as possible the real-time analysis performed
by the Fed when forecasting, at each period of time, on the basis of dif-
ferent vintages of data sets.
5 The experiment is real time because we
consider the releases on GDP and GDP deflator specific to each vintage
and because each vintage has missing data information at the end of
the sample reflecting the calendar of data releases. This allows us to re-
produce, each month within the quarter, the typical end of the sample
unbalance faced by the Fed; due to the lack of synchronization of these
releases, missing data are more or less numerous depending on the
series considered. The experiment is pseudo because we do not have
real-time information for variables other than GDP and GDP deflator.
6
For each variable of interest, we write the forecast (or the nowcast)
as:
\ ^ | span(ut_k,k > 0)]
where ut = [u\t U2t)' is the two-dimensional vector of the common
shocks (normalized to be orthogonal white noise) estimated from the
following model on the vector xt\v of the variables of the panel:
xt\v — AFf + £t\v
Ft = AFt-i + But170 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
where Ft is the rxl (r > 2) vector of the static factors, A =
[A':,..., A'J' is the n x r matrix of the loadings, B is a r x q matrix, and
<^|j, is the n-dimensional stationary vector process of the idiosyncratic
component with covariance matrix E(£t\v£'t,v) = ¥. We assume that the
idiosyncratic components are weakly cross-correlated.
7
Having set the dimension of ut to be two, we identify the dimension
of Ff, r, by statistical criteria.
8 Notice that, while the dimension of ut
identifies the stochastic dimension of the economy (the number of
common shocks), the dimension of Ft(r), depends on the heterogeneity
of the lag structure of the propagation mechanisms of those shocks.
Typically, in a dynamic economy, r > q.
It is important to note that, to be able to express our forecast-
ing equation in terms of a one-sided filter on the two-dimensional
vector of the common shocks, we assume implicitly that they can
be recovered from the past of Ft of dim r > q (see Remark 4 in Ap-
pendix 6.1). This assumption is reasonable, provided that there are
enough leading variables in the panel and that r is sufficiently large
(see Forni et al., 2003). Under this assumption, we can write the model
for xt as:
xit\v = Q(L)ut + £t\v = cn(L)uit + Ci2(L)u2t + €t\v (1)
where G(L) = Aj(/r — AL)~
1B is the impulse response function of the
z'th variable to the common shocks.
The appendixes detail the estimation procedure. Let us outline it
here. In the first step, we use principal components to estimate the
parameters of the factor model A,A,B, and ^F; in the second step, we
use these estimates and the data (xi\v,x2\v, • • • ,xv\v) to apply the Kal-
man filter on the state-space model to obtain:
Ft = Proj[F( | x1]v,...,xv\v], t = 0,1,..., v + h
and ut. Notice that all these estimates depend on the vintage v, but we
have dropped the subscript for notational simplicity.
Once we have the nowcast and the forecast of the factors, we can
construct the nowcast and forecast of the variables.
9 Notice that this
forecasting method disregards the idiosyncratic component of each
variable. The intuition is that the idiosyncratic element captures that
part of the dynamics that is unforecastable because it is mostly
explained by high-frequency variations that reflect measurement error
or variable-specific dynamics.Monetary Policy in Real Time 171
Our objectives are the nowcasts and forecasts of the annualized
quarterly growth rate of GDP, the annual rate of change of the GDP
deflator, and the quarterly average of the federal funds rate.
We adapt this framework to estimate the factors on the basis of the
incomplete data set, i.e., a data set that, as we have described, is some
missing values corresponding to data not yet released. We write the
model as:
xt\v — AFf + E.t\v
Ft = AFt-x + But
where
E (<g | J = \j/it \v = $i if xit | v is available
= 00 if Xit | v is
 n°t available
*it | v =
 xit | v ^
 xit | v is available
= 0 if x^ | v is
 no
t available
Notice that imposing \J/it\v = oo when xa\v is missing implies that the
filter will put no weight to the missing variable in the computation of
the factors at time t.
The forecasts are computed each month, using the data available up
to the first Friday. The parameters of the model are estimated using
data up to the last date when the balanced panel is available.
In the estimation of the factor model, we use quarterly differences
of the annual GDP deflator inflation and the quarterly differences of
the federal funds rate, so we recover the levels of both variables by
using the last available values. Our forecasts are compared with:
1. The Greenbook forecast for (quarterly) inflation and output
(roughly corresponding to the second month of the quarter—four
releases out of eight).
2. The survey of professional forecasts for quarterly output and infla-
tion (released in the middle of the second month).
3. The futures on the federal funds rate (aggregate monthly forecast
to obtain quarterly forecast—take the forecast first day of the first
month).
4. The random walk forecast, only for inflation and the federal funds
rate, where we assume that the forecast at all the horizons is given by172 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
Table 5













































































the last available number of the federal funds rate and inflation at the
date in which the forcast is taken.
1
0 For the GDP growth rate, we con-
struct a naive forecasts that predicts a constant growth rate equal to the
average growth rate over the sample 1970:1-1988:12 to have a measure
of overall forecastability.
Table 5 reports root mean squared errors (RMSE) of the three vari-
ables relative to our model (forecasts produced during the second
month of the quarter) and the ratio of the RMSE by the survey of pro-
fessional forecasters (SPF) conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, the Greenbook (GB), and the future markets with respect
to our model. The forecasts are performed using the whole sample but
are reported only since 1989, when we start having information on the
future market forecasts. Notice that Greenbook forecasts are available
to the public only up to 1996. The table shows the following features:
• Our forecasts on inflation and output are overall very close to the
Greenbook forecasts, with our model doing better in the short-run for
output and in the long-run for inflation. Notice also that the factor
model does relatively well for the nowcast of output, where there is
predictability, and for inflation at the longer horizons, which are those
relevant for policy.Monetary Policy in Real Time 173
• For inflation, the factor model outperforms the random walk bench-
mark, suggesting that there is forecastability in inflation four quarters
ahead. At that horizon, the Greenbook has similar performance to the
random walk, as noticed by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). In general,
the factor model outperforms the SPF's, while it is close to the Green-
book forecasts.
• The random walk does poorly for the federal funds rate, and the
market's forecast is best. The two-factors model does well, however, at
horizon two. As many have observed (e.g., Evans, 1998), it is very hard
for a statistical, automatic model to beat the markets at the short hori-
zon since those forecasts incorporate information such as the dates of
the meetings, the chair's last speech, and institutional events, to which
models cannot adapt. As we will see below, however, our performance
is close to the market's when the Fed moves its instrument a lot, espe-
cially during recessions. In general, the forecasting performance of the
two-factor model is far superior to the one based on a Taylor rule using
Greenbook's inflation forecasts and real-time output gap estimates.
Altough that model achieves a good in-sample fit, it does very poorly
in forecasting (see, for example, Rudebusch, 2001; Soderlind, Soder-
strom, and Vredin, 2003).
Overall, these results tell us that a simple linear two-factors model
does well at mimicking the behavior of the Fed. Notice that this anal-
ysis qualifies results by Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and Stock and
Watson (1999), which found that taking into account information
on many variables helps forecasting. Our results confirm that find-
ing and show that two shocks (dynamic factors) are sufficient to obtain
it.
The analysis of forecasting performance over time sheds some fur-
ther light on the federal funds rate behavior. Figures 1 to 3 illustrate
forecast errors squared (panel A) and forecasts (panel B) for output at
a zero-quarter horizon (nowcast), inflation at a one-year horizon, and
the federal funds rate at a one-quarter horizon and for different fore-
casting models.
Let us make the following observations:
• The two-factors model does very well in forecasting output, espe-
cially during recessions, when all variables comove strongly. This is
not surprising since it exploits optimally collinearity in the data. On
average, we are close to the Greenbooks. Note that we identified the
beginning of the last recession (first quarter of negative growth) one174 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
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quarter after it occurred, while the SPF identified the peak when the
recession had already ended.
• Concerning inflation, the two-factor model does well in detecting the
decline that followed the 1990 recession. In addition, unlike the SPF,
the model does not overestimate inflation in the 1990s (overprediction
of inflation during this period has been noted by Brayton, Roberts,
and Williams, 1999; Rudebusch, 2001), but it misses the upsurge of
inflation in the late 1990s. Finally, it identifies well the last decline in
inflation.
• For the federal funds rate, the factor model does well when it does
well in predicting output and inflation and during recessions, when
the Fed moves a lot. In particular, our model does well during the fall
of the federal funds rate at the beginning of the 1990s because it can
capture both the decline of output during the recession and the decline
of inflation that occurred when the recession ended. The factor model
can predict the monetary easing started in 2001, when it also predicts
in a timely way the 2001 recession and the decline of inflation started
in the second half of 2001. On the other hand, the two-factors forecast
performs poorly during the preemptive strike against inflation in 1994,176 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
when the Fed responded not only to its own predictions of inflation
but also to market expectations (see Goodfriend, 2002) and during the
monetary tightening that started in the late 1990s. That episode is asso-
ciated with an increase in inflation that was not predicted by the two
shocks. Finally, the two-shocks model does not predict the cut in the
federal funds rate in the second half of 1998, which was not justified in
terms of shocks on inflation and real activity but rather as a response to
the financial market turbulence associated with the Russian crisis. This
is an example of judgmental policy that cannot be incorporated in sim-
ple rules. (On this point, see Svensson (2003).)
What do the results of the forecasting exercise tell us about monetary
policy in real time? The key message is that a two-shocks model does
well in forecasting output and inflation even when compared with
tough benchmarks such as the SPF and the Greenbook. This brings ad-
ditional support to our claim that the relevant dimension of the U.S.
economy is two. Second, the model produces a good forecast of the
policy instrument, suggesting that it captures some essential elements
of the forecasting model of the Fed and its reaction function. What are
these elements? The first, as already observed, is the reduced dimen-
sion. The second is the particular version of output and inflation to
which policy responds. We turn to this analysis in the next section.
3. The Dimension of the Policy Problem
3.1 What are the Two Large Shocks?
This section moves to the structural interpretation. If the stochastic
dimension is two, two large shocks must drive the economy. Can we
identify them?
Let us define the forecast errors from the Greenbook model as:




where h = — 1,0,1,..., 4. For h = — 1 and h = 0, we have errors on revi-
sions, while for h = 1,..., 4 we have errors from the Fed's model.
Figure 4 plots errors for inflation against those for output at different
values of h. Visual inspection of the figure suggests no clear pattern of
correlation. Indeed, our calculations show that only a few of them are
significantly different than zero, and very little survives once the reces-
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Figure 4
Correlation of inflation and output, Greenbook forecast errors
uncertainty about inflation originates from sources that are weakly cor-
related with the sources of uncertainty about real activity. In other
words, the inflation and output shocks faced by the Fed are not much
correlated. This is in line with the results reported by Romer and
Romer (1994), who found that the ability of the Fed to predict output
is not related to its ability to forecast inflation.
How strong is the correlation between nominal and real variables
induced by the two shocks? If it is weak, then there must be a real
shock explaining the bulk of GDP dynamics, and a nominal shock
explaining the bulk of inflation dynamics. To investigate this point, we
compute ex-post and real-time impulse response functions to ortho-
gonalized shocks extracted from our panel of observations. We will
start by reporting ex-post estimates (i.e., estimates on revised data for
the whole sample). We will move to the ex-ante real-time analysis in
the next subsection.
For the ex-post exercise, we proceed as follows. We identify the
real shock as the one that explains the maximum variance of the178 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala










where JR is the set containing the positions of the real variables in the
panel. This identification procedure allows us to exploit information
on the multivariate dynamics of the panel and to extract a shock that
has its main effect on the real sector of the economy so that we can
label it real. The other shock is labeled as nominal. Figure 5 illustrates
impulse response functions for GDP, the federal funds rate, and infla-
tion to the real and nominal shocks,
1




A few comments are in order:
• The shape of the responses of the federal funds rate and output to the
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Figure 6
Inflation, output, and the federal funds rate: realizations and conditional histories
response to the nominal shock, the federal funds rate leads inflation
and it responds more than one to one.
• Even though this is not the focus of the paper, note that neither of the
two shocks can be identified as a monetary policy shock. This is justi-
fied by two findings: one of the two shocks is permanent on output,
the second moves inflation and the federal funds rate in the same di-
rection. For further analysis on this point, see our earlier work in Gian-
none, Reichlin, and Sala (2002).
• GDP is driven mainly by the real shock, the deflator is driven mainly
by the nominal shock, and the federal funds rate is driven by both.
• The real component explains a big part of recessions, in particular in
the early 1990s. Since the dynamics of output associated to the nominal
shock is small, the Phillips curve relation is weak.180 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
• The sums of the conditional histories, for each variable, are their cor-
responding common component (the components driven by the two
common shocks). We can infer from figure 6 that they represent a
smoothed version of the variable, which tracks quite well medium-
term dynamics.
Essentially, the federal funds rate responds vigorously to both
shocks. At first sight, this is not surprising since they are the large
shocks affecting output, and inflation and output and inflation are the
variables usually considered as objectives of monetary policy. We will
show in Section 4 that the previous statement can be generalized: to
the extent that there are only two shocks in the economy, any couple
of uncorrelated variables can be used to explain the movements in the
federal funds rate.
As a robustness check, we also follow the more traditional strategy
(see Blanchard and Quah, 1989) of assuming that there exists a transi-
tory and a permanent shock on output. We impose the restriction that
the long-run multiplier on the transitory shocks on output is equal to
zero, i.e., that cy2(l) = 0 in equation (1).
Impulse response function and conditional histories from the two
identification schemes give almost identical results. As expected, the
permanent shock is almost identical to the real shock, while the transi-
tory is identical to the nominal (we do not report results for this identi-
fication here; they are available on request).
3.2 Real-Time Analysis of the Shocks
Shocks in real time are conditional forecast errors derived from the
real-time forecasting exercise. We can build on the forecasting exercise
of the previous section to produce impulse response functions of the
common shocks derived from the conditional real-time forecasts. Let
us define:
w»(T1,T2)=xi]T2-x*u]Tl, T2>Tl
as the difference of the path for the common component of variable
Xu, defined as x*t estimated at time Ti, and the path that was expected
at time T\. These quantities should be understood as weighted reali-
zations of shocks that occurred between time T\ and Tj_, where the
weights depend on the propagation mechanism of the shocks.
1
3 If a
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Wit(Ti,T2) will reflect the series-specific propagation mechanism and
the realizations of such disturbance.
More precisely, for t>T\, wu(T\, T2) is an estimate of:
dn(L)uij1+i + di2{L)u2:Tl+i H 1-dn(L)uhT2 + di2(L)u2,T2
A particular case is t > T\ + 1, when Wit(T\,T\ + 1) is an estimate of
the impulse response function weighted by the realization of the shock
at time Ti +1, i.e., ^(Ljwi^+i + d2(L)uij1+1.
For example, suppose that T\ is the first quarter of 2001, the last
peak announced by the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER), and that T2 is the fourth quarter of 2001, the corresponding
trough. Then w^(Q1.01, Q4.01) measures the convolution of the propa-
gation mechanism for the variable X\t with the shocks that have gener-
ated the recession.
Forecast errors conditional on the permanent shocks can be obtained
by shutting down the transitory shocks. The same can be done for the
transitory shocks.
We report selected episodes: the two recessions in our sample and
two episodes of inflation scares. From left to right, the plots in Figures
7 and 8 must be read as unconditional impulses on output, the federal
funds rate, and inflation, and impulses conditional on the permanent
shock for the same variables and impulses conditional on the transi-
tory shock, respectively.
Here is what emerges from the analysis:
• Recessions
1. 1990Q3-1991Q1. The interest rate reacts to the decline in output
with a lag, but very aggressively. Very little happens to inflation be-
cause the recession is almost entirely driven by the real shock. The in-
terest rate therefore reacts to the real shock and not to the nominal.
2. 2001Q1-2001Q4. The real shock is also the driving force for this re-
cession. Inflation dynamics is driven by the nominal shock. Inflation
continues to decline conditionally on that shock, even after the recov-
ery has started. The federal funds rate moves aggressively with output
during the recession, moving before inflation declines.
• Inflation scares
1. 1993Q4-1995Q2. The upsurge of inflation is driven entirely by the
nominal component, which also drives output upward. This is a case
in which there is a Phillips relation. As we have seen from the ex-post





























































GDP level Federal fund rate GDP deflator
Figure 7
Recessions
the nominal shock, i.e., conditionally on the small shock on output.
In this episode, the federal funds rate moves with output and leads
inflation.
2. 1999Q2-2000Q3. Inflation moves up with the nominal shock and so
does output. The federal funds rate moves upward aggressively with
inflation.
The picture emerging from the ex-ante, real-time analysis is similar to
what emerged from the ex-post analysis: the real shock affects output
but not inflation, the nominal shock affects inflation but not output.
Notice that inflation moves very little during recessions. Facing
large movements, the Fed reacts aggressively either to inflation or to
output. What is most important, as noticed by Romer and Romer
(1994), is that large movements in inflation and large movements in








































































GDP level Federal fund I GDP deflate
Figure 8
Inflation scares
4. Taylor Rules: Discussion
As we have seen, the fundamental business-cycle dynamics of the U.S.
economy is driven by two shocks. We have seen from the historical ac-
count of the forecasting performance of the two-shocks model that the
responses of the federal funds rate to nonfundamental fluctuations, i.e.,
to those fluctuations driven by shocks other than the two large com-
mon ones we have identified, are not systematic. In our frame work,




It is then easy to see that, even if the Fed reacted, in addition to out-
put and inflation, to other variables driven by the fundamentals, their
inclusion in the federal funds rate equation would not improve the fit.
This policy would be observationally equivalent to a systematic policy
reacting to inflation and output only. Inflation and output, as we have184 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
seen, are indeed highly correlated with, respectively, the nominal and
real part of the economy and they are nearly orthogonal at business-
cycle frequencies, so they capture well the two-dimensional space gen-
erated by the two fundamental shocks.
Ex-post estimates of the Taylor rule point at a simple function: the
Taylor rule is a simple contemporaneous relation between the federal
funds rate and the output gap and inflation. Does such simplicity re-
flect the simplicity of the Federal Reserve policy or the fact that real
and nominal variables react similarly to, respectively, the real and
nominal shocks?
To investigate this issue we have run two sets of regressions.
First, we have regressed the component of the federal funds rate
generated by the real shock on the components of all real variables
generated by the real shock (cumulated). Second, we have regressed
the component of the federal funds rate generated by the nominal
shock on the components of all nominal variables generated by the
nominal shock (cumulated).
We have obtained two sets of fits—nominal and real—and con-
structed 10% lower and upper bands by excluding, at each t, the 20%
of extreme points (10% lower and 10% upper). The upper quadrant of
Figure 9 reports the bands as well as the projection of the federal funds
rate on GDP and the federal funds rate conditional on the real shock
that we have reported earlier (see Figure 6). The lower quadrant does
the same for the nominal case.
Figure 9 shows a striking similarity of shapes within the real and
nominal group. Not only do the lower and upper bounds move in the
same direction, but both the projection of the federal funds rate on real
GDP, conditional on the real shock, and the projection of the federal
funds rate on the deflator, conditional on the nominal shock, are within
the bands. Considering that the variables analyzed are quite different,
this is indeed a strong result. The U.S. economy is simple not only be-
cause it is mainly driven by two shocks, but also because the responses
of real variables to the real shock are similar and so are the responses
of nominal variables to the nominal shock.
Obviously variables are not completely synchronized, and some
leading-lagging relations can be identified.
1
5 The lower bound curve
leads the upper bound curve. The projection on GDP leads the real
component of the federal funds rate, which implies that the latter leads
GDP (real variables). On the contrary, from the lower quadrant, we can
see that the conditional federal funds rate leads inflation (nominal vari-Monetary Policy in Real Time 185
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Figure 9
Taylor fits
ables) and crosses often the lower bound. The fact that the federal
funds rate is lagging with respect to real variables might be a conse-
quence of the fact that information about the real side of the economy
is less timely than financial or price information.
From an ex-ante perspective, one possible interpretation of our
results is that the Fed, instead of tracking two particular variables such
as a version of measured output gap and inflation, follows a robust
policy, moving when all real variables (and among them GDP) move
and all nominal variables (and among them the inflation rate) move.
In real time, the exercise of nowcasting and forecasting by the Fed
essentially amounts to smoothing out short-run dynamics and unfore-
castable idiosyncratic variance from output and inflation, making use
of information contained in a large cosssection of data and exploiting
their comovements as well as their historical leading and lagging rela-
tions. This applies specific filters to output and inflation. Our analysis
suggests also that the filters are two-sided and that this is a conse-
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Figure 10
The output gap (centered), unemployment rate, the permanent component of output,
output generated by the real shock
not perfectly aligned and that the leading ones are used to nowcast
and forecast inflation and output.
We can also ask how the output variable we have used relates to
current measures of the output gap. We have seen that we can inter-
pret the large shock on output as either a real shock or as the shock
generating long-run movements in output. However, Figure 10 shows
that not only the output component generated by the real shock
and the long-run component are empirically very close to one another,
but (more disturbingly) that the output gap measured as the Hodrick-
Prescott filter on output and the (centered) unemployment rate are
both strongly correlated with those two components. The correlation,
with the exception of the mid-1990s, is striking.
This suggests that a major aspect of uncertainty faced by the central
bank is the lack of knowledge on whether shocks affecting the econ-
omy are of long or short duration. As we have seen, output growth at
horizons longer than two quarters is unforecastable. This implies that it
is hard to measure the long-run effect of the shocks and, as a conse-Monetary Policy in Real Time 187
quence, to distinguish between the output gap and long-run com-
ponent of output. Although the permanent component contains, by
construction, the zero frequency (long-run) component, its measure is
strongly correlated with detrended output. The unemployment rate,
on the other hand, is very persistent and its natural level is badly mea-
sured (see also Staiger, Stock, and Watson [1997] and Orphanides and
Van Norden [2002] for the consequences of this observation on real-
time monetary policy). This obviously leads to a problem of interpreta-
tion on what the Fed does. Does it follow the permanent component of
output, the output gap, or simply the forecastable component of out-
put growth?
Finally, let us notice that our model is estimated in difference form,
which implies that the nonsystematc component of the policy equation
has a unit root. This is a consequence of the fact that the real interest
rate is very persistent (see, for example, Rudebusch, 2001). Since the
federal funds rate, inflation, and output either have a unit root or are
close to the unit root case, in real-time, their level is difficult to forecast.
A rule in first differences is easier to implement (see also Orphanides,
2003). However, with a first difference specification, we cannot learn
anything about important issues such as the level of the natural rate of
interest or the natural rate of unemployment.
5. Conclusions and Some Caveats
The message of this paper can be summarized as follows. The complex
dynamic interaction among many macroeconomic variables in the U.S.
economy can be captured by two aggregates. The bulk of medium- and
long-run dynamics of output is explained by one shock that has similar
effects on all real variables and the bulk of medium- and long-run
dynamics of inflation by a shock, orthogonal to it, that has a similar ef-
fect on all nominal variables. The federal funds rate, by responding to
the two large shocks, can track the fundamental dynamics of both out-
put and inflation, i.e., the dynamic correlated with the whole economy
and that it is forecastable. Occasionally, the Fed may decide to monitor
special events, such as exchange rate crises or surges in inflationary
expectations from the private sector that are not correlated with its
own forecasts of the fundamentals, but this judgmental part of policy
seems to be small.
The consequence of these results is that the simple Taylor rule found
to fit U.S. data so well may be interpreted as the ex-post result of a
policy that ex-ante, responds vigorously when all real variables or all188 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
nominal variables move together. The weak trade-off between output
and inflation and between output and inflation in the Greenbook
forecasts suggest that inflation scares and recession scares can be
addressed as distinct stabilization problems.
The main purpose of our analysis has been to identify the history of
U.S. monetary policy in the last twenty years and point out problems
of interpretation of results from existing studies. From a real-time per-
spective, it is important to understand what the Fed has done, given
uncertainty about the current and future state of the economy and the
delays in data releases. We have seen that output growth is unforeca-
stable at long horizons, which makes any rule based on the identifica-
tion of the long run on output or its residual unreliable. Inflation, on
the other hand, is more forecastable at longer horizons. In both cases,
the forecastable component is one that correlates with the rest of the
economy. A normative implication is that a robust rule should not de-
pend on idiosyncratic movements of specific variables but rather move
when all real or nominal variables move. One possible interpretation of
this finding, is that the Fed, indeed, follows this type of rule. This con-
jecture is supported, in particular, by the fact that we replicate well
the policy behavior during recessions. These situations are also those
in which the Fed has been successful in reacting promptly to output
decline.
There are other important aspects of the monetary policy debate
where our analysis is not informative. Although we can say something
about what the Fed has done, we cannot quantify the effect of mone-
tary policy on the economy. For example, the finding on the weakness
of the Phillips curve trade-off might be an effect of successful policy.
Such analysis would require the specification of a structural model. At
this stage, however, structural models have not produced forecasting
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ut~WN(0,Iq)
where
Ft is the r x 1 (r > 2) vector of the static factors
A = [A'-L ,..., A'J' is the «xr matrix of the loadings
B is ar x q matrix of full rank q
A is an r x r matrix and all roots of det(Ir — Az) lie outside the unit
circle
£f is the n-dimensional stationary linear process
We make two assumptions.
1. Common factors are pervasive:
liminf|-A'Al>0 liminff-A'A)
w^oo \n J
2. Idiosyncratic factors are nonpervasive:
lim - (max v
rv¥v) = 0
n-^cc n \v'v=l J
Consider the following estimator of the common factors:
T n




Define the sample covariance matrix of the observable (it):
1
 T
Denote by D the r x r diagonal matrix with diagonal elements given
by the largest r eigenvalues of S and by V the n x r matrix of the corre-
sponding eigenvectors subject to the normalization V'V — Ir. We esti-
mate the factors as:
Ft = V'xt190 Giannone, Reichlin, & Sala
The factor loadings, A, and the covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic
components, *¥, are estimated by regressing the variables on the esti-
mated factors:
T / T \~
l
A = V^Ft' \Y]FtF
ft) =V
and:
Y = S - VDV
The other parameters are estimated by running a VAR on the esti-
mated factors, specifically:
t=2 \t=2
1=2 \ t=2 /
Define P as the q x q diagonal matrix, with the entries given by the




The estimates A, ^A,^ can be shown to be consistent as n,T —> oo
(Forni et al, 2003).
Having obtained the estimates of the parameters of the factor model,
the factors are reestimated as:
Pt = Proj[Ff | Ji,..., xT], t = 0,1,...,t + h
by applying the Kalman filter to the following state-space repre-
sentation obtained by replacing estimated parameters in the factor
representation:
xt = AFt + ^
Ft = AFt-i + But
ut~WN(0,Iq)
and \it =Monetary Policy in Real Time 191
Remark 1 When applying the Kalman filter, we set to zero the off-
diagonal elements of the estimated covariance matrix of the idiosyn-
cratic since they are poorly estimated if n, the dimension of the panel,
is large. However, assumptions Al and A2 ensure that even under
such restriction the factors can be consistently estimated.
Remark 2 The estimates of the factors in the second step are more effi-
cient since the Kalman filter performs the best linear projection on the
present and past observations.
Remark 3 In practice, the procedure outlined above is applied to
standardized data, and then the sample mean and the sample standard
deviation are reattributed accordingly.
Remark 4 Since the r-dimensional factors Ft are assumed to have a
VAR representation, the c\ common shocks are fundamental; i.e., they
can be recovered from the present and past of the r factors. Notice
that, since r » q, our assumption is weaker than the assumption of the
fundamental nature of the ^-dimensional common shocks ut with re-
spect to any two of the factors, or any couple of common components.
In particular, the common shocks ut are in general a function not only
of the present and past but also of the future of any couple of common
components (see Forni et al., 2003).
6.2 The Dataset
Series:
1 Index of IP: total
2 Index of IP: final products and non-
industrial supplies
3 Index of IP: final products
4 Index of IP: consumer goods
5 Index of IP: durable consumer goods
6 Index of IP: nondurable consumer
tronn c
7 Index of IP: business equipment
8 Index of IP: materials


























































































10 Index of IP: materials, nonenergy,
nondurables
11 Index of IP: mfg
12 Index of IP: mfg, durables
13 Index of IP: mfg, nondurables
14 Index of IP: mining
15 Index of IP: utilities
16 Index of IP: energy, total
17 Index of IP: nonenergy, total
18 Index of IP: motor vehicles and parts
(MVP)
19 Index of IP: computers, comm. equip.,
and semiconductors (CCS)
20 Index of IP: nonenergy excl CCS
21 Index of IP: nonenergy excl CCS and
MVP
22 Capacity utilization: total
23 Capacity utilization: mfg
24 Capacity utilization: mfg, durables
25 Capacity utilization: mfg, nondurables
26 Capacity utilization: mining
27 Capacity utilization: utilities
28 Capacity utilization: computers, comm.
equip., and semiconductors
29 Capacity utilization: mfg excl CCS
30 Purchasing Managers Index (PMI)
31 ISM mfg index: production
32 Index of help-wanted advertising
33 No. of unemployed in the civ. labor
force (CLF)
34 CLF employed: total
35 CLF employed: nonagricultural
industries
36 Mean duration of unemployment
37 Persons unemployed less than 5 weeks
38 Persons unemployed 5 to 14 weeks
39 Persons unemployed 15 to 26 weeks
40 Persons unemployed 15+ weeks


























































































(continued)Monetary Policy in Real Time 193
Series:
42 Employment on nonag payrolls: total
43 Employment on nonag payrolls: total
private
44 Employment on nonag payrolls: goods-
producing
45 Employment on nonag payrolls:
mining
46 Employment on nonag payrolls:
construction
47 Employment on nonag payrolls:
manufacturing
48 Employment on nonag payrolls:
manufacturing, durables
49 Employment on nonag payrolls:
manufacturing, nondurables
50 Employment on nonag payrolls:
service-producing

















































52 Employment on nonag payrolls: retail
trade
53 Employment on nonag payrolls:
wholesale trade
54 Employment on nonag payrolls:
financial activities
55 Employment on nonag payrolls:
professional and business services
56 Employment on nonag payrolls:
education and health services
57 Employment on nonag payrolls: lesiure
and hospitality
58 Employment on nonag payrolls: other
services
59 Employment on nonag payrolls:
government
60 Avg weekly hrs. of production or
nonsupervisory workers ("PNW"): total
private
61 Avg weekly hrs of PNW: mfg
62 Avg weekly overtime hrs of PNW: mfg
63 ISM mfg index: employment
3 0.59 0.67 0.78
3 0.66 0.78 0.83
3 0.31 0.32 0.52
3 0.51 0.65 0.71
3 0.19 0.26 0.42
3 0.39 0.48 0.57
3 0.32 0.39 0.59
3 0.25 0.36 0.45



















64 Sales: mfg and trade—total (mil of
chained 96$)
65 Sales: mfg and trade—mfg, total (mil of
chained 96$)
66 Sales: mfg and trade—merchant
wholesale (mil of chained 96$)
67 Sales: mfg and trade—retail trade (mil
of chained 96$)
68 Personal cons, expenditure: total (bil of
chained 96$)
69 Personal cons, expenditure: durables
(bil of chained 96$)
70 Personal cons, expenditure:
nondurables (bil of chained 96$)
71 Personal cons, expenditure: services (bil
of chained 96$)
72 Personal cons, expenditure: durables—
MVP—new autos (bil of chained 96$)
73 Privately-owned housing, started: total
(thous)
74 New privately-owned housing
authorized: total (thous)
75 New 1-family houses sold: total (thous)
76 New 1-family houses—months supply
at current rate
77 New 1-family houses for sale at end of
period (thous)
78 Mobile homes—mfg shipments (thous)
79 Construction put in place: total (in mil
of96$)(l)
80 Construction put in place: private (in
mil of 96$)
81 Inventories: mfg and trade: total (mil of
chained 96$)
82 Inventories: mfg and trade: mfg (mil of
chained 96$)
83 Inventories: mfg and trade: mfg,
durables (mil of chained 96$)
84 Inventories: mfg and trade: mfg,
nondurables (mil of chained 96$)
85 Inventories: mfg and trade: merchant
wholesale (mil of chained 96$)
3 0.71 0.77 0.83
3 0.76 0.82 0.87
3 0.53 0.60 0.70
3 0.33 0.47 0.58
3 0.47 0.63 0.71
3 0.36 0.53 0.62
3 0.30 0.48 0.56
3 0.41 0.55 0.61
3 0.19 0.42 0.57
3 0.53 0.62 0.71






3 0.56 0.65 0.74
3 0.65 0.70 0.76
3 0.59 0.68 0.72
3 0.59 0.67 0.71
3 0.36 0.47 0.55
3 0.30 0.39 0.49






86 Inventories: mfg and trade: retail trade
(mil of chained 96$)
87 ISM mfg index: inventories
88 ISM mfg index: new orders
89 ISM mfg index: suppliers deliveries
90 Mfg new orders: all mfg industries (in
mil of current $)
91 Mfg new orders: mfg indusries with
unfilled orders (in mil of current $)
92 Mfg new orders: durables (in mil of
current $)
93 Mfg new orders: nondurables (in mil of
current $)
94 Mfg new orders: nondefense capital
goods (in mil of current $)
95 Mfg unfilled orders: all mfg industries
(in mil of current $)
96 NYSE composite index
97 S&P composite
98 S&P P/E ratio
99 Nominal effective exchange rate




104 Commercial paper outstanding (in mil
of current $)
105 Interest rate: federal funds rate
106 Interest rate: U.S. 3-mo Treasury (sec.
market)
107 Interest rate: U.S. 6-mo Treasury (sec.
market)
108 Interest rate: 1-year Treasury (constant
maturity)
109 Interest rate: 5-year Treasury (constant
maturity)
110 Interest rate: 7-year Treasury (constant
maturity)
111 Interest rate: 10-year Treasury (constant
maturity)



















































































































































113 Bond yield: Moodys BAA corporate
114 Ml (in bil of current $)
115 M2 (in bil of current $)
116 M3 (in bil of current $)
117 Monetary base, adjusted for reserve
requirement (rr) changes (bil of $)
118 Depository institutions reserves: total
(adj for rr changes)
119 Depository institutions: nonborrowed
(adj for rr changes)
120 Loans and securities at all commercial
banks: total (in mil of current $)
121 Loans and securities at all comm banks:
securities, total (in mil of $)
122 Loans and securities at all comm banks:
securities, U.S. govt (in mil of $)
123 Loans and securities at all comm banks:
real estate loans (in mil of $)
124 Loans and securities at all comm banks:
comm and Indus loans (in mil of $)
125 Loans and securities at all comm banks:
consumer loans (in mil of $)
126 Delinquency rate on bank-held
consumer installment loans (3)
127 PPI: finished goods (1982 = 100 for all
PPI data)
128 PPI: finished consumer goods
129 PPI: intermediate materials
130 PPI: crude materials
131 PPI: finished goods excl food
132 Index of sensitive materials prices
133 CPI: all items (urban)




138 CPI: medical care
139 CPI: commodities












































































































































































































142 CPI: all items less food
143 CPI: all items less shelter
144 CPI: all items less medical care
145 CPI: all items less food and energy
146 Price of gold ($/oz) on the London
market (recorded in the p.m.)
147 PCE chain weight price index: total
148 PCE prices: total excl food and energy
149 PCE prices: durables
150 PCE prices: nondurables
151 PCE prices: services
152 Avg hourly earnings: total
nonagricultural (in current $)
153 Avg hourly earnings: construction (in
current $)
154 Avg hourly earnings: mfg (in current $)
155 Avg hourly earnings: finance,
insurance, and real estate (in current $)
156 Avg hourly earnings: professional and
business services (in current $)
157 Avg hourly earnings: education and
health services (in current $)
158 Avg hourly earnings: other services (in
current $)
159 Total merchandise exports (FAS value)
(in mil of $)
160 Total merchandise imports (CIF value)
(in mil of $) (NSA)
161 Total merchandise imports (customs
value) (in mil of $)
162 Philadelphia Fed business outlook:
general activity (5)
163 Outlook: new orders
164 Outlook: shipments
165 Outlook: inventories
166 Outlook: unfilled orders
167 Outlook: prices paid
168 Outlook: prices received
169 Outlook employment




Series: mation 12 3
















0: no transformation. Xt
1: logarithm. log(X()
2: quarterly differences. (1 — L
3)Xt
3: quarterly growth rates. 400(1 - L
3) log(X,)
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1. Greenbook data can be obtained from the Web site of the Philadelphia Fed:
www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/greenbookdatasets.html.
2. These estimates are computed on data aggregated at the quarterly level.
3. For the project at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, on which the present
paper is based, we have used a formal analysis to select q and found it to be 2.
4. This percentage is above 80% if we concentrate on business-cycle frequencies.
5. Real-time data, organized in vintages, have been obtained from the Philadelphia Fed
Web site: www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/reaindex.html.
6. The fact that we use revised data should not affect our results because revision errors
are typically series specific and hence have negligible effects when we extract the two
common factors. The robustness of the pseudo real-time exercise has been demonstrated
by Bernanke and Boivin (2003).
7. For a definition of identification conditions and other technical aspects of the model,
see Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2002); Stock and Watson (2002).
8. We apply the criterion of Bai and Ng (2000) for the sample 1970:1-1988:12. This crite-
rion is very sensible to different specifications of the penalty term but suggests a quite
large value of r. We select r — 10 and find that results are robust over larger values. This
is explained by the fact that the methodology is robust if we select a static rank higher
than the true one, provided that the dynamic rank, q, is well specified. On this point, see
Forni, Giannone, Lippi, and Reichlin (2004).
9. The Kalman filter step improves on the principal component estimator proposed by
Stock and Watson (2002) by allowing us to take into explicit account the dynamics of theMonetary Policy in Real Time 199
panel. An alternative strategy, in the frequency domain, is that followed by Forni, Hallin,
Lippi, and Reichlin (2002).
10. As for the factor model, we use the real-time series of the GDP deflator.
11. Confidence intervals have been computed by bootstrap methods, as we did in Gian-
none, Reichlin, and Sala (2002) and as in Forni et al. (2003).
12. The mean has been attributed to the two conditional histories according to the long-
run variance decomposition. For GDP, this corresponds to 1 to the real shock and 0 to the
nominal; for the federal funds rate, .67 and .33, respectively; for the deflator, .8 and .2,
respectively.
13. To isolate the effects of the shocks from the difference arising from the estimation of
the parameters, we estimate the model at time T\ and keep the same parameters to com-
pute the signal at time T2.
14. The Ljung-Box Q-statistic at lag 1 on the idiosyncratic components of the fedral funds
rate is 1.2, with a p-value of 0.27. The statistic is also not significant for a higher lag.
15. This is not a surprising result since, if all real variables had contemporaneous condi-
tional dynamics and so did nominal variables, we would have found the dynamic rank
to be equal to the static rank, i.e., r = q.
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This paper holds an enticing promise. Start from the observation that
Taylor rules work well to explain the observed paths for the federal
funds rate. Add to that the insight of recent research on macroeco-
nomic factors, that a large share of the movements in the main aggre-
gates of the economy can be explained by only a few, perhaps two,
fundamental forces or shocks; see, for example, Forni et al. (2000),
Stock and Watson (2002), Uhlig (2003), and the paper at hand. Con-
sider that it may be more appealing to state Taylor rules in terms of
forecasts of the output gap and inflation rate, and note that macroeco-
nomic factor models are good for providing forecasts. Then you get the
promise that this paper holds: to understand monetary policy choices
or to conduct monetary policy, pay attention to the macroeconomic
factors and the two key shocks driving their movements.
This promise is enticing, because monetary policy needs to make its
choices in a "data-rich environment" (Bernanke and Boivin, 2003). Or-
dinarily, one would need to pay attention to each bit of the plethora of
information in the many time series observable by the policymaker
and consider how to react to it. Similarly, analysts of monetary policy
need to sift through the many influences on monetary policy to see
why and when interest rates move. But equipped with the factor anal-
ysis in this paper, one can reduce and organize this wealth of infor-
mation into a few key shocks only, which then warrant most of the
attention. The rest is idiosynchratic noise, which one should not ignore
entirely but which is of small residual importance. The techniques in
the paper at hand show how to construct the relevant factors and to as-
sess their impact on the key macroeconomic aggregate in real time, i.e.,
in terms of the data available to policymakers at decision time.
This discussion is organized around this promise. I agree that the
factor model works remarkably well for forecasting inflation, output202 Uhlig
growth, and the federal funds rate. I also agree that the main macro-
economic aggregates seem to be driven to a considerable degree by
two shocks only: this indeed is an important insight. But I caution
against the promise described above, which a reader of Giannone,
Reichlin, and Sala's paper might take away all too easily as the implied
conclusion. To show why I think this promise is problematic, I shall
ask and answer three questions.
1. Do Taylor Rules Fit Because of Dimension Two?
Figure 1 shows a simple benchmark Taylor rule, estimated by regress-
ing the federal funds rate on a constant, lagged inflation and the devia-
tion of lagged log gross domestic product (GDP) from its five-year
moving average (as a crude measure of the output gap), using quar-
terly data from 1971 to 2001. The R
2 is 0.60.
Gianonne, Reichlin, and Sala (GRS) view these regressors as well as
the federal funds rate as part of a panel xt of macroeconomic time se-
ries, driven by ten macroeconomic factors Ft, which in turn are driven
by two shocks ut, plus noise £t:
xt = AFt +
Ft = AFt-i But
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Figure 1
Taylor Rule, estimated with lagged CPI inflation and lagged log GDP minus its five-year
moving average, quarterly dataComment 203
Hence, the static dimension is ten, whereas the dynamic dimension is
two. With this, instead of regressing the federal funds rate rt on some
measure of the output gap gt and inflation nt, it would seem to be
more direct to regress the federal funds rate on the factors Ft, in partic-
ular as one can thereby avoid the noise component £f in the regressors.
But in contrast to what one may be led to believe by GRS, this does
not improve matters. First, while the original Taylor rule gets by with
just two regressors, the first two factors alone provide a pretty bad fit
(the R
2 is just 0.07), and even with all ten factors, the picture does not
look great. See Figure 2: the R
2 increases to just 0.20.
Part of the reason for the bad fit seems to be that the factors are cal-
culated with, for example, the first differences of interest rates, so they
may be more informative about changes in the federal funds rate than
its level. Thus, Figure 3 uses both the factors as well as their cumula-
tive sums as regressors. This does not change the dynamic dimension
since the two-dimensional shock vector ut still suffices to explain also
the evolution of the cumulative sums, but it does double the number
of regressors. With two factors (and thus four regressors), one obtains
an R
2 of 0.74, while with all ten factors (and thus twenty regressors),
R
2 is 0.94, and one obtains nearly perfect fit. Of course, with twenty
regressors, this may not be very surprising. Note that my results here
are consistent with the results of Table 2 in their paper, where, for ex-
ample, the first two dynamic principal components can explain 72% of
the variance of the first difference of the federal funds rate, and addi-
tional regressors would presumably be needed also to get the level of
the federal funds rate right. My results are also consistent with Section
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Figure 2
Taylor Rule, estimated with the first two respectively all ten factors204 Uhlig
Factor Taylor rule with 2 factors
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Figure 3
Taylor Rule, estimated with the first two respectively all ten factors plus their cumulative
4 of GRS, which concentrates not on the original federal funds rate
series, but on that part of the federal funds rate series that can be
explained with the real or the nominal factors, discarding the possibly
more important noise of the federal funds rate factor regression.
What the exercise above shows is that a two-dimensional shock ut
does not imply at all that a Taylor rule with two regressors closely re-
lated to these ut will fit well. Since Ft is ten-dimensional, and is thus
recording lagged ut's as well, it would in fact be surprising if all this
rather complicated dynamics of the two underlying shocks could be
folded into just two macroeconomic time series, output and inflation.
So the fact that the original Taylor rule fits so well may have little to
do with the issue that the dynamic dimension of the economy is two.
Instead, it is plausible that something else is going on: simple Taylor
rules fit well because monetary policy cares about the output gap and
inflation. Typical theoretical derivations of optimal monetary policy
often have that feature; see, for example, Woodford, 2003 (And if not,
one could try to identify those macroeconomic aggregates that the
monetary policymaker cares about: it is these aggregates, not the fac-
tors, that should show up in Taylor rules of well-chosen monetary pol-
icy). Thus, there is a good chance that the noise component £,t in the
output gap and inflation is of similar or even greater importance for
monetary policy than the movements of the underlying factors. The
two-factor model in turn also fits reasonably well because two factors
suffice to fit the bulk of the cyclical dynamics in output and inflation.
However, since the noise part £t is missing in the factor model, the fit
is worse.Comment 205
To illuminate this, consider the original Taylor rule:
rt = a + /]gt + ynt + et
and suppose that the output gap gt and inflation nt have a particularly
simple dependence on two factors, which in turn have a particularly
simple dynamic structure:
gt = AgFit + £gt
7lt = AnFit + int
Assume that all innovations et,Uit,U2t\ £gt, and £,nt have zero mean and
are mutually orthogonal. If the Taylor rule is recalculated using the fac-
tors, one obtains:
rt = a + {pXg)Flt + {yXn)F2t + vt
where
vt = P£gt + y£nt + Et
has a higher variance than et/ and the fit is therefore worse than the




the best-fitting factor Taylor rule would now be:
rt = a (fti)F (^)F (^)F fa
The fit is just as bad as for the factor Taylor rule in the simple specifica-
tion above, but now four rather than two regressors are required in the
factor Taylor rule, just to keep up with the original specification.
These arguments (plus the arguments in the third section below)
provide good intuition for the findings above. In sum, a two-factor
Taylor rule does work. But it is worse, not better, than the original
output-gap-and-inflation Taylor rule. It is the original Taylor rule that
captures the essence of the underlying economic logic, and the factor
model just happens to provide a statistically good fit, not the other
way around, as GRS may lead a reader to believe.206 Uhlig
The key assumption in the arguments above is the orthogonality of
st to £gt and £nt. If it was the case, for example, that vt is orthogonal to
£gt and £nt in the simple specification above, with:
then obviously the factor Taylor rule would fit better. One way to in-
terpret GRS is that they take this perspective and not the perspective
of the preceding argument. To check which perspective is appropriate,
one needs to investigate why the Fed deviates from the Taylor rule, i.e.,
to explain the movements in Et. Let me turn to this issue now.
2. Why Does the Fed Deviate from the Taylor Rule?
There is another reason to be interested in explaining the movements
in the residual of the original Taylor rule, even if one buys into the
argument by GRS, that simple Taylor rules work because the economy
is two-dimensional. If all we get out is another Taylor rule, have we
really learned much? Central bankers often assert that their job is con-
siderably more complicated than just running a Taylor rule. Whether
this is just a self-serving claim (or worse the result of faulty monetary
policy analysis) or whether their job is really considerably more com-
plex shall not be the issue discussed here (although I do believe the lat-
ter to be the case). Rather, we do observe empirically that gaps remain
between actual federal funds rate choices and those implied by Taylor
rules (see, for example, Figure 1). So the interesting issue is, What
explains these deviations from the Taylor rule, and can the macroeco-
nomic factors help to resolve these issues?
To answer this question, I have done the following. I calculate the
Taylor rule residual as in Figure 1 but based on data from 1955 to
2001. I fit a Bayesian vector autoregression (VAR) in this residual as
well as PPI inflation, industrial production, hours worked, capacity uti-
lization, private investment, and labor productivity in manufacturing,
using quarterly data from 1973 to 2001 and two lags. The goal shall be
to explain as much as possible of the movement in the Taylor rule re-
sidual with as few different types of shocks as possible. Thus, in the
seven-dimensional space of the one-step-ahead prediction errors, I find
those two dimensions that explain most of the sum of the k-step ahead
prediction revision variances for the Taylor rule residual. I explain the
details of this methodology in Uhlig (2003), and they are similar to theComment 207
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Figure 4
Fraction of the variance of the fc-step ahead forecast revision for the Taylor rule residual,
explained by two shocks in the seven-variable VAR with other economic variables
construction in GRS, Section 3.1, when they construct shocks to "ex-
plain the maximum of the variance of real variables in panel."
I find the following. Two shocks can explain around 90% of the vari-
ance of the /c-step-ahead prediction revision variance for all horizons k
between 0 and five years (see Figure 4). The impulse response of the
Taylor rule residual to the first shock is fairly persistent (see Figure 5)
and coincides with movements of labor productivity in manufacturing
in the opposite direction (see Figure 6). This suggests that the deviation
here could be explained by a more subtle measurement of the output
gap: the Fed sets interests rates higher than would be implied by the
line calculated in Figure 1 because it sees output not supported by cor-
responding gains in productivity. And indeed, industrial production
changes course from an initial expansion to a contraction within two
years. The second shock looks like a quickly reverted error in interest
rate policy (see Figure 7).208 Uhlig
Figure 5
Impulse response of the Taylor rule residual to the first shock, 0 = 0
One can redo the same exercise using the ten factors in the VAR
instead of the economic variables listed above. To obtain impulse
responses for these variables, they can in turn be regressed on the
VAR series and their innovations, plus their own lags. The results are
now much less clear cut. First, the fraction of variance explained for
the Taylor rule residual is not quite as high (see Figure 8). The impulse
response of the Taylor rule residual to the first shock in Figure 9 seems
to be in between the more persistent response of Figure 5 and the
quick-error-reversal response in Figure 7. And the implied impulse
responses of industrial production and productivity do not tell a clear-
cut story (see Figure 10): industrial production has no clearly signed re-
sponse, while productivity keeps expanding gradually.
This clinches the point made above: for monetary policy, the noise
component of some key economic variables may be more important
than the stochastic disturbances to the factors. The factors paint too





















Impulse response of the Taylor rule residual to the second shock, 0 = 90
3. Do We Need to Worry About Causality?
At this point, a skeptical reader might point out that this discussion be-
gan with calculating factor Taylor rules with ten factors and their par-
tial sums, and that they provided a nearly perfect fit. Shouldn't this be
good news for an analysis of monetary policy, based on macroeco-
nomic factors? But aside from factors capturing the economically rele-
vant variables—the output gap and inflation—there is another reason
that the Taylor rule estimated with all ten factors and their cumulative
sums should fit well. The ten factors are the leading ten principal com-
ponents of the variance-covariance matrix of a panel of macroeconomic
time series. According to Table 1 in GRS, a substantial fraction of the
variables included in the panel are closely related to monetary policy
or are likely to react sensitively to changes in the federal funds rate.
For example, the variables labeled as "financial markets," "interest
rates," and "money and loans" count for 22% of the entire panel and
probably an even higher fraction of the total variance. Since varianceContinent 211
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Figure 8
Fraction of the variance of the A:-step ahead forecast revision for the Taylor rule residual,
explained by two shocks in the eleven-variable VAR with ten factors
matters for the calculation of the principal components, the influence of
these variables is likely to be even larger than 22%. So there is a sense
in which the factor Taylor rules above or, likewise, the fraction of the
variance in the federal funds rate explained by the factors as stated in
the paper, are just regressions of the federal funds rate on itself.
Whether or not this is a problem hinges on whether or not one
believes some monetary policy shocks are not explained by economic
fundamentals. If there are none or if they are negligible, then the infor-
mation contained in the movements of financial market variables just
reflects the underlying economic fundamentals, and this appears to be
the position the paper implicitly takes. Indeed, the paper gives an eco-
nomic interpretation to the two shocks and views them as untainted by
monetary policy shocks. A substantial fraction of the VAR literature on
monetary policy can be read as supportive of this position.
On the other hand, if there are sizable monetary policy shocks, then
the principal component shocks identified in the paper are likely to be212 Uhlig




Impulse response of the Taylor rule residual to the first shock in the eleven-variable VAR
with factors, 0 = 0
at least partly tainted by monetary policy shocks, or even to represent
the monetary policy shocks themselves (when using some linear com-
bination of the factor shocks). The 22% of the variables closely related
or reacting sensitively to the federal funds rate then move in reaction
to monetary policy choices, or even anticipate them, due to speeches,
information released between federal open market committee (FOMC)
meetings, etc., and so will the extracted factors. Even using factors
extracted from data available before the FOMC meeting may just re-
cover market expectations and echoes of previous Fed announcements.
Analyzing the movements of the extracted factors thus will not be
helpful for choosing interest rates or understanding these choices.
Another way to see this is to think about the information contained
in futures. Table 5 in GRS shows that the root mean square error
(RMSE) for futures/2-shocks is 0.47 for lead 0 and 0.76 for lead 1, so in







with data on futures than with data on factors. But that does not imply
that the Fed should follow what futures markets expect it to do nor is
this of helpful guidance to the Fed; the futures presumably simply fit
so well because they pay close attention to signals coming from the
Fed about what it plans to do in the future, not the other way around.
Thus, similarly, if the extracted factors contain market expectations
about Fed policy, then the forecasts constructed with these factors for
inflation and output growth rates are the resulting inflation rates and
output growth rates, if the Fed fulfills these expectations. This is useful
for monetary policy; for example, the Fed then can and should ask if it
wants to deviate from these on-the-equilibrium-path expectations. But
that does not answer the question about where these expectations
came from in the first place.
So if there are monetary policy shocks, then one would ideally seek
to find factors and factor innovations which are causal to Fed choices
and Fed announcements, both for conducting policy as well as for
understanding Fed choices. This gets us into the usual VAR identifica-
tion debates. This debate is assumed away in this paper by implicitly
assuming that monetary policy shocks are too small or matter too little
to be of relevance to the extracted factors.
4. Conclusion
Current thinking about monetary policy (as in Woodford [2003], for
example) focuses on the output gap, inflation rates, and their forecasts
and relates them to choices of the interest rate. Perhaps it is sensible
and possible to write down theories in which the relevant economic
variables for conducting monetary policy are factors or in which the
right measure of the output gap corresponds to what GRS have cap-
tured with their factors. But a priori, I remain skeptical. What matters
to monetary policy are rather specific variables and their rather specific
own dynamics: the macroeconomic factors can be somewhat but not
sufficiently informative about them. The noise component does matter.
Thus, I view the methodology provided by GRS mainly as a method
to provide the Fed with on-the-equilibrium-path forecasts of output,
inflation, and interest rates, i.e., as a forecast of the economy, provided
the Fed follow market expectations. Where these expectations come
from or what the fundamental forces are to which the Fed reacts
requires additional substantive identifying assumptions (like the ab-
sence of monetary policy shocks), which one ought to be careful in
making.Comment 215
Despite all these skeptical remarks and despite the obligation of
the discussant to describe what he or she disagrees with, it is also im-
portant to emphasize where the agreements are and to point out the
achievements of GRS. Their paper has convincingly demonstrated that
two shocks capture the main dynamics of a large number of macro-
economic aggregates. This is interesting and it is an important base
on which to build macroeconomic theories, which emphasize few,
not many, driving forces. GRS have also shown that interesting things
can be done with these factors. I share their view that there is much
more of a dichotomy between the real and the nominal side of the
economy than is often believed, and that it may be feasible for mone-
tary policy to concentrate on fighting inflation without having to
worry too much about the real side of the economy. Excessive worries
about real effects were the original reason that the Volcker disinfla-
tion came so late. The real impact of the disinflation turned out to
be smaller than many anticipated (see the discussion in Cogley and
Sargent, 2004). Excessive worries sometimes dominate monetary policy
discussions also, especially in policy circles outside central banks. It is
remarkably hard to justify these worries with a proper analysis of the
data, as I have found in my own work (see Uhlig, 2004), and as GRS
have also shown in their paper. It is time to use data rather than just
conventional wisdom as a guide to monetary policy analysis and to
take these results seriously.
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This paper considers three questions. How many shocks are needed to
explain the comovement of variables in the macroeconomy? What are
these common shocks? And what are the implications of these findings
for empirical characterizations of monetary policy rules?
The paper argues that very few shocks—only two—are needed. The
authors arrive at this conclusion using three complimentary exercises.
First, they apply large-n dynamic factor analysis methods to a data set
that includes 200 representative macroeconomic time series over the
1970-2003 time period. A distributed lag of two shocks (the equivalent
of two dynamic factors) explains a large fraction of the common vari-
ance in these series. Second, they apply similar methods to a panel of
forecasts of fifteen important variables from the Fed's Greenbook over
the 1978-1996 period. Again, it seems that much of the variance in
these forecasts is explained by two shocks. Finally, the 2-shock/200-
variable model is used to construct pseudo-real-time forecasts of the
growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP), the growth rate of
the GDP deflator, and the federal funds interest rate over the 1989-
2003 time period. Short-run forecasts based on the two-factor model
perform well.
The authors identify the shocks as real and nominal. Real variables
are driven by the real shock, inflation is driven by the nominal shock,
and both shocks are important for the federal funds rate. These results,
the authors argue, provide a mechanical explanation for why the Tay-
lor rule provides a good description of the federal funds rate. The fed-
eral funds rate depends on two shocks, output growth is related to one
of the shocks, inflation is related to the other; thus, a regression of the
federal funds on output growth and inflation fits the data well.Comment 217
In my comments, I will address each of these points. First, I will re-
view empirical results from the 1970s on the fit of the two-factor model
to see how the results have changed over time. Remarkably, the empir-
ical results from the 1970s are nearly identical to the results found in
this paper. Second, in some parts of the paper, the authors argue that
inflation is driven by the nominal shock, output is driven by the real
shock, and the two shocks are uncorrelated. This implies that move-
ments in output and inflation are uncorrelated, a result that appears at
odds with a large literature that documents a positive correlation be-
tween movements in output and inflation (the Phillips correlation). I
will present results that reconcile the paper's finding of a weak correla-
tion between output and inflation, with a larger and stable Phillips cor-
relation. Finally, I offer a few remarks about the paper's two-factor
explanation for the fit of the Taylor rule.
2. Can the U.S. Macroeconomy Be Summarized by Two Factors? A
View from the 1970s
Rigorous statistical analysis of multifactor models in macroeconomics
started with the work of Sargent and Sims (1977) and Geweke (1977).
Indeed, Sargent and Sims considered many of the same empirical ques-
tions addressed in this paper, albeit with somewhat different methods
and data. They used small-n frequency domain factor analysis and
U.S. macroeconomic data from 1950-1970, while this paper uses large-
n factor methods and data from 1970-2003. A comparison of the
results in the two papers provides an assessment of the robustness of
the results to the sample period and statistical method.
Table 1 shows the results from both papers on the fit of the two-
factor model. The results are strikingly similar. One factor explains
much of the variance of the real variables. The second factor adds little
additional explanatory power for the real series. In contrast, nominal
prices require two factors. In both papers, retail sales have more idio-
synchratic variability than the other real series and only a small frac-
tion of the variability of Ml is explained by the two factors. The only
major difference between the two sets of results is for sensitive mate-
rials prices, a result that is not surprising given the dramatic swings
in this series that occurred in the sample period used by Giannone,
Reichlin, and Sala. In summary, the good fit of the two-factor model
seems a remarkably stable feature of the postwar U.S. data.218 Watson
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1. From Table 21 of Sargent and Sims (1977).
2. From Appendix 6.2.
3. What Happened to the Phillips Correlation?
The positive correlation between real activity and inflation is one of the
most well-known stylized facts in macroeconomics. Yet this correlation
is not apparent in the scatter plots in Figure 4 of the paper, and the
paper argues that output and inflation are largely reflections of inde-
pendent sources of variability. Has the Phillips correlation vanished,
or is it somehow masked in the factor model? The answer to both
questions is no. Rather, many of the results in this paper highlight cor-
relation over high frequencies (where the correlation is weak) instead
of business-cycle frequencies (where the correlation is stronger).
In the spirit of the paper's analysis, I have constructed an estimate
of the real factor and an estimate of the inflation factor. For the real fac-
tor, I use the XCI described in Stock and Watson (1989), which is a
weighted average of the logarithm of real personal income, industrial
production, manufacturing and trade sales, and employment. For the
inflation factor I use a simple average of the inflation rates of the con-
sumer price index, the producer price index, and the price deflator for
personal consumption expenditures.
Figure 1 shows an estimate of the coherence between the two factors
estimated using monthly data from 1960-2003.
1 Recall that the coher-
















Coherence of output and inflation factors
so that, roughly speaking, the figure shows the correlation of the series
over different frequencies. The coherence is approximately 0.45 for
frequencies lower than 0.50 (periods longer than 12 months), but it is
only 0.10 for frequencies higher than 1.0 (periods shorter than 6
months). Evidently, the series are very weakly correlated at high fre-
quencies, but the correlation is substantially larger over business-cycle
frequencies.
Figure 2 tells a similar story using the correlation of forecast errors
constructed from a bivariate VAR of the two factors. Correlations are
small for short horizons (less than 6 months), but they increase to
values larger than 0.35 for horizons longer than 18 months.
Figures 1 and 2 show results for the 1960-2003 sample period, but
similar results are obtained over the 1989-2003 period, the pseudo-
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Note: These results are computed from estimated VAR(6) models using monthly data.Comment 221
4. Using the Two-Factor Model to Rationalize the Fit of the Taylor
Rule
If the two-factor model is correct, then the federal funds rate depends
on two factors. The real factor is reflected in GDP, the nominal factor
is reflected in inflation; thus, as the paper argues, it is reasonable that a
Taylor rule specification should fit the data well. Yet the story is little
more complicated. GDP growth and inflation are imperfect indicators
of the underlying factors. The logic of the factor model then says that
including (potentially many) other variables in the regression may sig-
nificantly improve the fit of the Taylor rule because these additional
variables help the regression estimate the factors. Indeed, this logic
suggests that a better way to study the monetary policy rule is to use
factor models like those developed in this paper and in the complimen-
tary analysis in Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and Giannone, Reichlin,
and Sala (2002).
Note
1. The coherence was estimated from a VAR(6) model estimated from the first differ-
ences of the two factors. Similar results were found using different lag lengths in the
VAR.
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Lucrezia Reichlin commented on Harald Uhlig's discussion and
pointed out that, as shown in his example, not any two aggregates
were going to give as good a fit as output and inflation did in the Tay-
lor rule. Inflation and output, she claimed, are very collinear with the
rest of the economy and that was why one gets very good forecasting
results by projecting on two shocks. She also believed that her forecast-
ing results were very impressive since nobody in the vector autoregres-
sion (VAR) literature had gotten close to such results.
Reichlin also responded to Uhlig's concern about the fact that the
authors mainly looked at the systematic part and not at the residuals.
She said that their empirical work showed that the residual part, the
nonsystematic part, was very small, which does not mean that the Fed-
eral Reserve always followed systematic output and inflation, as was
seen in her example of the Russian crisis episode, but that on average
one could explain the bulk of its actions by looking at the systematic
part.
There was some discussion among the participants about Uhlig's
reservations about the Phillips curve models. Michael Woodford stated
that simple models of the Phillips curve relationship, even the ones that
did not have any kind of important disturbances to them, were not
going to imply that an increase in real activity should lead to the same
increase in inflation. According to Woodford, the authors showed that
there was a first type of shock that permanently increased real GDP
and had little effect on inflation. If one interpreted that permanent in-
crease in real GDP as also a productivity-driven increase in GDP, then
one should not expect much effect on inflation. Then there was a sec-
ond shock that had a big effect on inflation and could be interpreted as
a disturbance orthogonal to a technology shock, which had a tempo-Discussion 223
rary effect both on the real activity and on inflation, which in turn was
what a Phillips curve relationship implied.
Mark Gertler commented that in his opinion Uhlig's point was that
even if one had a Phillips curve, the actual reduced-form correlation
between output and inflation depended on how well the central bank
was performing. He added that one might want to split the sample
and look at pre- and post-1979, since in his view if the central bank
was doing well, as was the case of the Federal Reserve from the mid-
1990s, then the economy might not look very different from what a real
business cycle model, with some qualifications, would predict. Reichlin
remarked that although the lags in the Phillips curve might be coming
from the effect of policy, and one way to tackle this problem was to
look at subsamples, she believed that their forecasting results showed
that if one ran the model through the whole period, on average, one
tracked the federal funds rate well.
Several discussants expressed their view on the number of shocks
needed to characterize the economy. Robert Gordon said that in his
opinion the economy was characterized by three factors, although they
could be reduced to two. The three original factors were the real factor,
used also by the authors, that we observed in the form of the negative
correlation between unemployment and output; nominal inflation,
which was driven by the growth of money; and the supply shocks,
which were used to solve the dilemma that sometimes output was neg-
atively correlated with inflation, as in the case of an increase in oil
prices, and other times this correlation was positive, as occurred when
the economy was hit by a pure monetary shock as in the German
hyperinflation. But if one used a simple model with a vertical long-run
Phillips curve, a short-run positively sloped Phillips curve on the out-
put-inflation space, a negatively sloped demand curve, and finally a
policy response, then two shocks, demand and supply shocks, were
enough to obtain the responses the authors were looking for. Accord-
ing to Matthew Shapiro, two real shocks were needed to fit most of
the data. He argued that there were short-term productivity shocks
and there were other shocks that moved the trend, either the growth
rate of productivity or the NAIRU, and if one implemented a Taylor
rule, one had to keep track of both the timeless and the time-variant
parts of unemployment, so he wondered how the authors could get
such good results with only one real shock. Reichlin answered these
comments by saying that they had run different specifications of the224 Discussion
model, with two and three shocks, and found that the third shock was
very small. She added that from the forecasting results they had
shown, one did not seem to need a third shock to improve the forecast-
ing of the model.
Jean Boivin stated that in one of his papers they found that to be
able to track well the dynamic response of the economy, as the one
obtained in a VAR setup, more than two factors were necessary. He
then wondered about the size of the residuals in the policy rules of the
authors and if the key for the difference in their results could be found
there. Reichlin replied that she did not think that their results contra-
dicted his since what she and her co-authors were saying was that,
given that the dimension was roughly two, then the Taylor rule should
be a good fit. This did not mean, she added, that one could not im-
prove the Taylor rule, which could be done by writing the Taylor rule
in terms of shocks, although in that case one might run into invertibil-
ity problems, as Mark Watson pointed out. Concerning the size of the
residuals, she commented that when looking at the federal funds rate
in first differences, medium-run frequencies, one could explain 80% of
the variation, which meant that 20% of the variation was what they
called unsystematic behavior and this led them to think that there was
no other dimension.